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Abstract: In this article, I examine the moral dimensions of gender affirmation. I 
argue that the moral value of gender affirmation is rooted in what Iris Murdoch 
called loving attention. Loving attention is central to the moral value of gender 
affirmation because such affirmation is otherwise too fragile or insincere to have 
such value. Moral reasons to engage in acts that gender affirm derive from the 
commitment to give and express loving attention to trans people as a way of 
challenging their marginalization. In the latter part of the paper, I will discuss 
how my arguments bear on recent arguments by Robin Dembroff and Daniel 
Wodak (2018) on the use of gender-neutral language. They argue that we have a 
duty not to use gender-specific pronouns for anyone. Their conclusion turns, in 
part, on a rejection of gender affirmation as a moral duty. The value of gender 
affirmation, rooted in our moral perception of trans people, should make us 
skeptical of this conclusion, in favor of a more nuanced and pluralistic approach 
to the ethics of gendering.   
 
 
Though we may hardly notice, we are constantly being gendered and gendering 
others. Nearly every visit to the bank or a restaurant involves a “Hello, sir” or a 
“Thank you, ma’am.” Whenever we talk about our friends, coworkers, or spouse, 
we likely use gendered language—most commonly, we use gendered pronouns. 
“I went out to drinks with her last week;” “He is late every Tuesday;” “She will 
call him tomorrow.” Using gendered language is nearly inescapable. 
Unfortunately, given the ubiquitous gendering in our society it is extremely 
common for trans people to be gendered in ways that do not conform to their 
gender identity, that is, to be misgendered. In order to avoid being misgendered 
many people leave preferred pronouns in email signatures or wear them as pins 
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around strangers.1 In most queer spaces, preferred pronouns are urged to be 
respected in order to not only avoid misgendering but also to gender affirm trans 
people. When making introductions, it is encouraged that people share preferred 
pronouns along with names. Beyond using gendered-pronouns a number of 
others interactions can give one gender affirmation: a trans woman having a door 
held open for her, a trans man getting a head nod from another man, or a 
genderqueer/non-binary person2 having gender-neutral language used for 
them.3 
There is growing philosophical attention on the ethics of the language we 
use when interacting with trans people—specifically with regards to 
misgendering trans people. Stephanie Kapusta (2016) argues that dominant 
conceptions of womanhood exclude or marginalize trans women and explains 
how this in effect opens transgender persons up to a linguistic form of moral 
harm and oppression via gender-term deployments. The harms of misgendering 
are further explored by Robin Dembroff and Daniel Wodak (2018) where they 
argue that gendered pronouns can misgender genderqueer persons in addition 
to trans women and men. Furthermore, Dembroff and Wodak argue that the 
moral harm of misgendering is based in denying someone’s gender, making the 
moral duty to not misgender someone consistent with using gender neutral-
pronouns for everyone. That is, they argue it is not only morally permissible to 
use gender-neutral pronouns for everyone, regardless of one’s gender, but also 
that we should use gender-neutral pronouns for everyone.4   
While gender affirmation is a regularly discussed topic and a practiced 
norm in queer communities, most work in philosophy (and elsewhere) has 
focused on the wrongs of misgendering: the moral harm in being incorrectly 
gendered. Gender affirmation, on the other hand, goes beyond merely avoiding 
misgendering: it involves actively affirming a person’s gender.5 As Dembroff and 
Wodak (2018) point out, there is a space where one can avoid misgendering 
someone, but also not gender affirm them (for example, by using their name) 
(382-384).6 It is one thing to misgender someone and another to  affirm someone. 
In the interest of determining how we can be better allies to trans people, the 
topic of gender affirmation, in addition to that of misgendering, deserves 
philosophical exploration. In determining what makes gender affirmation 
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morally distinct, we can better understand how we should engage with our trans 
friends, family, neighbors, colleagues, and community members.  
I argue that the moral value of gender affirmation is rooted in what Iris 
Murdoch called a loving and just attention. I begin by giving a brief explanation 
of how I understand Murdoch’s notion of loving attention before tying this 
concept to gender affirmation. I then argue that loving attention is central to the 
moral value of gender affirmation because such affirmation is otherwise too 
fragile or insincere to have such value. Moral reasons to engage in acts that 
gender affirm derive from the commitment to give and express loving attention 
to trans people as a way of challenging their marginalization.  
In the latter part of the paper, I will discuss how my arguments bear on 
recent arguments by Robin Dembroff and Daniel Wodak (2018) on the use of 
gender-neutral language. They argue that we have a duty not to use gender-
specific pronouns for anyone. Their conclusion turns, in part, on a rejection of 
gender affirmation as a moral duty. The value of gender affirmation, rooted in 
our moral perception of trans people, should make us skeptical of this 




In response to the philosophical trends of their7 time—an action-centered 
utilitarianism and behaviorism, will-focused Kantianism, and decision-focused 
existentialism—Murdoch (1970) wanted us to reconsider the role of the inner 
moral life of perception.8 I take it that their work can be read as carving out a 
particular aspect of the moral life these popular theories overlooked, and not 
necessarily a rival moral theory all its own. Murdoch’s point comes out clearest 
in their famous example of M and D: M, a mother, perceives her son’s new wife, 
her daughter-in-law D, as vulgar, undignified, noisy, and tiresomely juvenile. 
Murdoch stipulates that M is perfectly nice to D and never lets her perceptions 
of D influence her actions toward her. So, while M may believe her son to have 
married beneath him, she does not allow her real opinion to appear in any way 
toward him or D. Murdoch invites us to further imagine that M is an intelligent, 
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well-intentioned person capable of self-criticism and eventually decides to 
reconsider her perception of D. M may reflect on how she is often old-fashioned, 
narrow-minded, snobbish, and almost certainly jealous of D. M, thus, resolves to 
look again. According to Murdoch, we can assume that M’s behavior has not 
changed at all, and that we can even imagine that upon “looking again”, D has 
moved away or has died, so that whatever changes about M, it will be a change 
in her inner moral life. As M reconsiders D, she realizes that D is not vulgar, but 
refreshingly simple; not undignified, but spontaneous; not noisy, but gay; not 
tiresomely juvenile, but delightfully youthful. M’s change in perception, 
importantly, is a moral change: she is perceiving in a morally better way 
(Murdoch 1970, 17-18). Murdoch’s point is that one’s moral perception 
constitutes an important moral landscape in itself. While other philosophers have 
recognized the importance of moral perception for our downstream moral 
actions, according to Murdoch important moral changes can occur entirely 
interior to a person’s psychology.9 M’s actions toward D doesn’t change at all, 
but there is still an important moral change here—she perceives D differently.  
According to Murdoch, our perception is often distorted by our self-
preoccupied nature:  
[Our perception] is not normally a transparent glass through which it 
views the world, but a cloud of more or less fantastic reverie designed 
to protect the psyche from pain. …by opening our eyes we do not 
necessarily see what confronts us. We are anxiety-ridden animals. Our 
minds are continually active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-
preoccupied, often falsifying veil which partially conceals the world. 
(Murdoch 1970, 76-77, 82) 
M’s own self-preoccupation and anxieties manifest in her prejudice and narrow-
mindedness, her snobbery and jealousy. These traits constitute her “falsifying 
veil”, which she sheds in order to attend properly. It is then that she can perceive 
D—when she is less concerned about her own cares, concerns, needs, and desires, 
and starts focusing on D’s. In other words, she is perceiving D on D’s own terms.  
 Someone is perceived properly, in my view,  when they are perceived on 
their own terms;  in other words, when their cares, concerns, needs, desires, and 
self-conception are salient, rather than the cares, concerns, needs and desires of 
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the perceiver. When one tries to perceive in this way, they are attending with 
what Murdoch calls a just and loving attention. When one is attempting to 
perceive someone on their own terms, one is directly attempting to overcome 
particular distortions. The “self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil” is made up 
primarily of our own cares, concerns, needs, and desires, which when suspended 
helps move toward accuracy because the objects of our perception are no longer 
being distorted by our self-preoccupation. 
 We can see how this works by returning to Murdoch’s original example 
of M and D. Imagine that D doesn’t find the societal expectations that govern 
much of M’s life important. She doesn’t care if she is always wholly proper and 
perhaps believes that a too weighty concern for propriety gets in the way of 
enjoying  life. When M perceives D on her own terms, she can realize that she’s 
not ignorant of being proper, but reflectively flouting such norms.  
 To further illuminate or explain the idea of loving attention, consider an 
analogy between moral perception and aesthetic perception.10 Murdoch’s notion 
of loving attention is meant to apply to art in addition to morals (Murdoch 1970, 
82-90). Lovingly attending to a film, like lovingly attending to a person, is a 
matter of attending to it on its own terms. What kind of movie is it trying to be? 
A thought-provoking drama, light-hearted rom-com, or escapist, fanciful action 
flick? Not all movies, or all art, are trying to do the same thing, and in perceiving 
the movie on its own terms, we get a better chance of appreciating what it does 
well. If you go into a Disney movie expected edge-of-your-seat-horror, you are 
likely to be disappointed. What the movie is trying to be and do is important for 
how you see it.11 The same, I believe, holds true for the various people in our 
lives. One of the exciting things about getting to know another person is learning 
about who they are as an individual and how they understand themselves. We 
often run into problems when we try to perceive others on our own cares, 
concerns, or desires, instead of perceiving others for who they are.  
 Marilyn Frye (1983), in articulating a contrast well-suited to Murdoch’s 
framework, has introduced the concepts of the “arrogant eye” and the “loving 
eye.” The former refers to perception that organizes everything around it in 
reference to the perceiver’s interests, and often creates what Frye called a “great 
wanting.” Frye states, “The wanting doesn’t care about truth: it simplifies, where 
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the truth is complex; it invents, when it should be investigating; it expects, when 
it should be waiting to find out; it would turn everything to its satisfaction; and 
what it finally thinks it cannot thus maneuver it hates” (Frye 1983, 75).  According 
to Frye, the job is not to deny this wanting, but to recognize and know it. In order 
to overcome its distorting effect, we must identify it, claim it, know its scope. 
Thus, Frye states that when one perceives with the loving eye, one does not 
“…make the object of perception into something edible, does not try to assimilate 
it, does not reduce it to the size of the seer’s desire, fear and imagination, and 
hence does not have to simplify. It knows the complexity of the other as 
something which will forever present new things to be known” (Frye 1983, 76). 
The loving eye for Frye is one that seeks the other person through critical 
checking and questioning of one’s self, not suppressing the perceiver’s wants and 
desires but recognizing how they lead one astray. Furthermore, such a task “will 
forever present new things to be known.” Similarly, Murdoch states that loving 
attention is an endlessly perfectible task (Murdoch 1970, 23). So, while we aim 
for accurate perception, we will never obtain a complete and accurate image of 
others, but only continually improve our perception in that direction.  
 
Gender Affirmation, Or Perceiving Someone on Their Own Terms 
There are two ways we may think about gender affirmation’s moral value. 
Acts of gender affirmation are, of course, actions—they are open to view, as 
opposed to confined to our inner moral lives. When determining the value of 
such actions we can think both of the consequences of those actions and the way 
those actions reflect the person doing the affirming. While any act of affirmation 
may bring about some good consequences (i.e., a trans person may feel affirmed), 
there is a difference between feeling affirmed and being affirmed. Merely feeling 
affirmed has the potential to be overturned—and quite quickly. A trans woman 
shopping may initially be referred to as “ma’am”, which will feel affirming, only 
for the speaker to immediately state, “Oh, I’m sorry—sir”, effectively stripping 
the affirmation away. Actions that merely create feelings of affirmation have 
fragile moral value (at best) because the feeling of affirmation can quickly be 
replaced by feelings of dysphoria or rejection. Stephanie Kapusta’s discussion of 
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“concessionary gender-term deployment” provides an illustration of such fragile 
apparently affirming acts. Kapusta speaks of cases where one uses “she”/“her” 
pronouns to refer to a trans woman, while still, nonetheless, thinking of her as 
“really a man.” As Kapusta argues, this is merely “a pitying concession to 
someone who—in the final analysis—has simply got her gender wrong” and is 
built upon the idea of not needing to take trans people’s testimony about their 
gender seriously (Kapusta 2016, 514). While one may at first feel affirmed by such 
instances of being referred to with gender affirming pronouns, upon realization 
that the speaker’s gender-term deployment is merely a courteous concession, one 
may not only feel misgendered but patronized as well. Truly being affirmed, in a 
way that has significant moral value, requires more than the use of a person’s 
preferred pronoun, with the consequence of the person feeling affirmed. For 
actions of gender affirmation to have stable moral value, then, the actions need 
to be rooted in something other than courtesy.  
My suggestion is that the moral value of gender affirmation is rooted in 
loving attention, in the sense of perceiving someone on their own terms. This 
includes two claims. The first is that gender affirmation involves perceiving trans 
people on their own terms—for their agential identity.  Loving attention, then, is 
at the root of gender affirmation’s moral value since it is an authentic recognition 
of that person’s agential identity. The second claim is that the moral reason to 
engage in acts of gender affirmation comes from reflecting this loving attention 
in our actions to trans people. This will require recognizing two further things: 
that reflecting virtue in one’s action is a way actions can get their moral value 
and that the cisnormative patriarchal society in which trans people live makes 
such reflection morally significant. Living in a cisnormative patriarchal society 
as a trans person also illuminates why gender is a significant part of a trans 
person’s “own terms.”  
Living life as a trans person often involves a confusing and complex 
relationship with one’s gender. As Talia Mae Bettcher has put it, trans people 
“live an ‘everyday’ shot through with perplexity, shot through with WTF 
questions” (Bettcher 2019, 8). Being trans often, if not necessarily, leads to 
questioning not only one’s socialized gender, but the role of gender, and asking, 
“why do people want to know if we’re really a man (or a woman, or non-
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binary)?” Struggling with these WTF questions causes trans people to have a 
more tumultuous relationship with their gender, a gender that they at some point 
doubted and often are not accepted as. This WTF that trans people live in is due 
to being trans in a cisnormative patriarchal society and is the context in which 
these concerns play. Given the immense mental energy spent on thinking about 
gender, it is often affirming to be gendered correctly. Thus, being correctly 
gendered often constitutes a significant care, concern for, and desire of trans 
people. It is part of the terms by which moral agents ought to perceive trans 
people if we are to perceive them with loving attention. 
For trans people, one’s gender is part of how one navigates the space 
between their self-identity and one’s social position. This “bridge” identity is 
what Robin Dembroff and Catharine Saint-Croix have called one’s agential 
identity. It is the part(s) of one’s self-identity that one presents to the world that 
connects with their social position. This process of presenting is what they call 
externalizing one’s self-identity. Dembroff and Saint-Croix use the example of 
someone who is gay but has yet to come out: they self-identify as gay, but until 
they communicate that to others, they lack the agential identity of being gay. 
They have not externalized their self-identity. When one lovingly attends to trans 
people, what they are doing is giving uptake to their agential identity. By 
externalizing one’s self-identity, one is presenting it as the terms by which they 
wish to be understood, the terms that one ought to attend to in perceiving them.  
 This account of agential identity, and particularly the externalization 
condition, helps clarify some nuances of when one’s behavior allows for gender 
affirmation. Dembroff and Saint-Croix write:  
Social phenomena, we reiterate, are messy. Intention, allowing, and 
acceptance are attitudes that admit of borderline cases. Someone who 
is just coming out as trans, for example, might well be uncomfortable 
with people taking her as a woman—she might be a borderline case of 
accepting and allowing. In this case, her agential identity with respect 
to gender will be vague (though her self-identity is not). Alternatively, 
she might be comfortable with strongly externalizing her self-identity 
in some contexts, but not at all in others. In this case, she may be 
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disposed toward ‘code-switching’ with respect to gender. (Dembroff 
and Saint-Croix 2019, 581) 
This case, of a trans woman in the middle of her social transition, is a good 
example of how one’s agential identity connects with the terms they wish to be 
perceived on. Her agential identity is vague because in some contexts, say with 
her queer friends, may well be different than her context at work or school. She 
may externalize her identity as a woman to her queer friends, but not her 
coworkers. A friend who straddles these two different worlds (that is, part of her 
inner queer friend group and is also a coworker) will find that there are some 
contexts where they should affirm her and contexts where they should assist in 
her code-switching.12 For something to be a part of one’s “terms”, in the relevant 
sense, it needs to be to externalized.  
 To say that the moral value of gender affirmation is rooted in loving 
attention does not necessarily mean one must always perceive with loving 
attention for their acts of gender affirmation to have moral value. Imagine a 
person who does not quite “get” being transgender. They cannot comprehend 
the idea of someone identifying with a gender other than the one they were 
assigned at birth because it is such an alien concept that they cannot wrap their 
mind around it. However, they also know that we live in a world of multiple 
oppressions. They reflect on the fact that their parents or grandparents once did 
not understand how someone could be gay and that they could be in a similar 
position regarding trans people. Such a perceiver may use opportunities to 
gender affirm their trans family, friends, or colleagues as a way of cultivating 
loving attention. That in performing these acts they hope to cultivate an attention 
to their agential identity and be able to perceive them on their own terms. In this 
case, the affirmation, that was perhaps once fragile, has strengthened itself. 
Affirmation as a way to cultivate loving attention, thus has moral value just as 
affirmation that comes from loving attention. This is due to how the moral value 
of gender affirmation is rooted in the loving attention, whether the affirmation is 
a result of such attention or an attempt to develop such an attention.  
Recognizing that gender affirmation’s moral value is rooted in loving 
attention does not exhaust what we can say about the morality of gender 
affirmation. As stated before, Murdoch’s own point was that moral perception is 
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part of the inner moral life, not the life of choices and external actions. But just 
because moral perception has moral value in itself, does not mean that’s where 
the moral importance ends. Sometimes one’s actions can gain moral value by 
reflecting good character traits or virtue. This becomes significant when said 
reflection is also communicating something important to a marginalized group 
of people, such as giving uptake to trans people’s agential identities.  
 At first glance, such reflecting may seem trivial or superficial. However, 
many actions create moral reactions in us from what they reveal about the actor’s 
character. Tom Hill (1983) argues that many environmentally damaging actions 
that some ethicists find to be morally wrong, but struggle to articulate how 
they’re morally impermissible, make us uneasy because they reflect a poor moral 
character, such as a neighbor who uproots all the beautiful trees in their yard. In 
light of such actions, Hill urges us to ask, “What kind of person would do that?” 
(1983, 214-216). The same, I believe, holds true for many morally good actions. 
We have reason to perform them because they reflect the kind of ideals, or 
virtues, we wish to cultivate and have.13  
 Hill was particularly concerned with understanding our moral reactions 
to environmentally harmful behavior that is difficult to call morally 
impermissible. For Hill, it was not about figuring out why those actions were 
wrong, but why we disapproved of them so strongly. When I discuss the 
converse case, of actions having positive moral value by reflecting virtue, I mean 
to say that the opportunity to reflect virtue gives us moral reason to do that 
action. It is one answer to the question, “how may loving attention influence our 
moral motivations for action?” In the particular case of gender affirmation, there 
is additional moral value in reflecting the specific virtue of loving attention to 
trans people, given the active erasure they face.  
 My claim that actions can obtain moral value via reflecting loving 
attention should not be confused as a way of discounting the role of intentions, 
consequences, or other sources of moral value. Murdoch was carving out a space 
of our moral lives that is absent from many pictures but is potentially compatible 
with these different views. There are, after all, many ways actions obtain moral 
value. Gender affirmation seems to necessarily involve how we perceive others 
due to fragility of affirmation when the value is entirely placed in the 
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consequences and due to the way the agential identity is a part of one’s identity 
that is externalized. Thus, reflecting or communicating this moral perception 
seems to be key to understanding the moral reasons one might have for gender 
affirming trans people.   
 I want to stress the importance of communicating this perception to trans 
people given the context of living in a cisnormative patriarchal society. When 
thinking about communicating one’s perception to another, it is important to 
remember that for trans people this is against the backdrop of a cisnormative 
society that actively erases and marginalizes them.14 Since trans people are 
actively erased and marginalized, affirming them reifies their status and fights 
against this oppression. There are a couple of reasons why this is morally 
important. The first is how it benefits them. Being erased in this manner is how 
trans people experience psychological oppression (cf. Bartky 1990, 22-23). 
Communicating one’s perception of them, and thus giving their agential identity 
uptake, is a way to fight against these psychic barriers.  
 Here one may be concerned that it is only when one is unintentionally 
affirmed, that is the agent doing the gendering does not know the person is trans, 
that affirmation succeeds. That is, it is in passing as a cis woman that a trans 
woman is affirmed, and not in her being affirmed as a trans woman. What I think 
is important here is that she is being read as a woman. She is being perceived on 
her own terms. In the case where the perceiver knows she is trans, if she is still 
being perceived as a woman, then I believe one is affirmed. This is evident by 
online communities like r/transpositive15 where trans people go to post pictures 
of themselves, in part, to be gender affirmed by other trans people and allies. This 
objection raises a separate question about whether there is moral value in the 
stranger who affirms a trans person without realizing they are trans, since there 
is no attending to them—just a passing act. In this case, the trans person will feel 
affirmed, and the felt value for the trans person is real, but it does not have the 
relevant moral value: there’s nothing the stranger did that is deserving of praise 
or recognition. Cases of unintentional affirmation are less fragile than in some of 
the previously discussed cases, such as “concessionary gender deployments”, 
but still lack the kind of perception that makes affirmation a moral act for the 
perceiver.16 
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The second reason why such affirmation is morally important is because 
of how reifying trans identities challenges their marginalization.17 Gender 
affirming trans people helps make them visible as paradigmatic cases of 
gendered experience. This needs a little fleshing out. While cisnormativity is 
multi-faceted, there is (at least) one-way gender affirming trans people 
challenges this kind of marginalization. Talia Mae Bettcher has argued that the 
dominant cultural practice is for gender presentation and gender terms (e.g., 
‘man’ or ‘she’) to communicate genital status (Bettcher 2009, 103-107). The 
dominant, or paradigmatic gendered experience then is for men to have one 
genital kind and women to have a separate kind. This way of communicating 
marginalizes and erases trans people in several ways. One way is what Bettcher 
calls “reality enforcement” where people try to determine the genital status of 
trans people, for example, by asking trans people, “have you had the 
surgery?”(Bettcher 2014, 392-397). By gender affirming trans people, one 
challenges these typical communicative processes by communicating something 
different when using gendered terms or responding to gender presentation. It is, 
in Bettcher’s terms, recognizing their first-person authority with regards to their 
gender, or similarly, in Dembroff’s and Saint-Croix’s terms, giving uptake to 
their agential gender identity. Part of the moral value of gender affirmation, then, 
is in its power to resist and challenge oppression, both on the individual, psychic 
level and on the macro-socio-systemic level (cf. Fakhoury, 2019). This macro-
socio-systemic level challenge is due, in part, to the way these practices promote 
a particular way of perceiving trans people, that is, as legitimate and 
paradigmatic examples of their gender. 
 That some of the moral value of gender affirmation lies in resisting 
oppression brings to light a further point: in most cases, there is little to no moral 
value in gender affirming cisgender people. While cisgender people still have a 
gender agential identity, in many cases gender is not a relevant part of their 
“terms” that require loving attention. Drawing attention to this aspect of their 
agential identity would not cause much affirmation because it is already 
receiving uptake by society. Simply put, cisgender people are often not 
marginalized with regards to their gender agential identity. They are already 
taken as paradigmatic cases of gendered life and experience. There is no 
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oppression here to resist or challenge. I do not mean to claim it is permissible to 
misgender cisgender people, but only that there is little moral value in gender 
affirming them.  
 There are some important exceptions to this broader claim.18 Black 
women, for example, often experience their gender identity stripped away from 
them as they are often masculinized or even made to be genderless.19 Just think 
about common criticisms of tennis champions Venus and Serena Williams as 
“really being men.”20  Despite being cis, they still experience a lack of uptake for 
their agential identity due to being both women and Black. There is a similar 
experience reported among people who are disabled (cf. Brown 2017). 
Furthermore, gender non-conforming people who are still cis may experience 
similar “reality enforcement” that Bettcher discusses where people find it 
important to determine what genitals they have. In all these cases, even though 
they are cisgender, they still feel pressure from how cisnormativity interacts with 
race, ability, and gender presentation. Such cases as these may fall closer to how 
we wish to engage with trans people: by gender affirming them.  
 I have argued that the moral value of gender affirmation is rooted in 
reflecting and communicating one’s perception of trans people on their own 
terms. Importantly, this is due to trans people living in a cisnormative patriarchal 
society. Given this context, gender affirmation can often function as a way of 
subverting the kind of “reality enforcement” that Bettcher argues is central to 
trans oppression by promoting communicative practices that take trans people 
as paradigmatic examples of their gender and promoting that way of perceiving 
them. However, one might think, following Dembroff and Wodak (2018) that 
there is a moral duty to use gender-neutral pronouns for everyone. Therefore, 
despite the value of gender affirming trans people, we ought to instead use 
gender-neutral pronouns for everyone. I want to suggest that Dembroff and 
Wodak overstate the moral importance of using gender-neutral pronouns. That 
is, there is no moral duty to use gender-neutral pronouns for everyone. Their 
arguments instead support a weaker claim: that we should default to gender-
neutral pronouns for people we do not know. In addition, I argue that insofar as 
they conceive of their project as being a moral duty, they have mis-described the 
moral terrain and preemptively close off discussions of other ways of 
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approaching these moral issues that are important for capturing the nuances of 
trans life under gender oppression. 
 
“He/She/They/Ze” 
Dembroff and Wodak (2018) make an impressive case for not only the 
view that non-binary people can be misgendered in the same way trans women 
and men are, but that the moral harm of misgendering is based in denying 
someone’s gender (as opposed to neglecting to affirm one’s gender), making it 
morally permissible to use gender-neutral pronouns for everyone, regardless of 
one’s gender. They believe that having a duty to affirm people’s gender is 
implausible. It would be far too demanding to have a duty to affirm people’s 
gender since there are plenty of ways of interacting with trans people that don’t 
affirm their gender—such as calling them by their first name (Dembroff and 
Wodak 2018, 383). Furthermore, it does not matter if someone has preferred 
pronouns, because it’s not due to those preferences that misgendering is wrong. 
Instead, many of the reasons why people have preferred pronouns (like wanting 
to be respected as a trans person or being granted resources) are the reasons for 
why we should not misgender them.21 Since the duty to not misgender relies only 
on the duty not to deny people their genders, as opposed to affirming them, it is 
consistent with a further, more radical, thesis that we have a “duty not to use 
gender-specific pronouns to refer to anyone, regardless of their gender identity” 
(372). They go on to provide three reasons for why we have this duty to not use 
gender-specific pronouns. 
First, there is no better alternative to using gender neutral pronouns for 
everyone because once we recognize the inclusion of genderqueer individuals 
we run into a dilemma. Either we’ll need to pick a singular pronoun set to refer 
to all non-binary people, or we’ll have to use different pronouns for all the 
various gender identities that fall under the non-binary umbrella (i.e., agender, 
genderfluid, demi-boy, demi-girl, bigender, etc.). Both horns of these dilemmas 
are not ideal. If we take the first horn and introduce a singular pronoun for all 
non-binary people, then this will be inegalitarian since the two “binary” genders 
of man and woman would have their own specific pronouns, and all non-binary 
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people would only have one (389). To solve this problem, we could take the other 
horn of the dilemma, but this would be unmanageable by our linguistic 
community. So, the best choice would be to pick one gender-neutral pronoun set 
for everyone regardless of gender identity. 
 Second, Dembroff and Wodak argue that since our language is so gender-
laden, queer people are often forced into a tricky moral situation where they 
either need to out their gender identity or orientation in situations when they 
would prefer not to (392). Trans people, who are often read as a gender they are 
not, will have to either disclose they are trans or lie/withhold the truth in order 
to keep this information a secret. Similarly, someone might be forced to disclose 
or deceive others about the gender of their partner, and thus their sexual 
orientation. In both situations, this problem could be solved by everyone being 
referred to with gender-neutral pronouns.  
 Third, and finally, they argue that there is legitimate reason to believe that 
gender-laden language plays a non-trivial role in spreading gender essentialist 
ideas, which reinforces sexist oppression (395).22 Removing gender markers from 
language would reduce the prevalence of these ideas, and thus combat gender 
oppression. It is important to note that gender neutralizing language would not 
only help in undermining sexist ideas about women, but also the essentialist idea 
that there are only two genders.  
 They do, however, note that this is not an exceptionless duty. They write,  
“…we recognize that our context abounds in countervailing 
considerations given that gender-specific pronouns are a beneficial 
resource for transgender persons. We have treated these 
considerations as generating possible exceptions to the general duty 
not to use gender-specific pronouns.” (403) 
Their argument is that we have a general moral duty not to use gender-specific 
pronouns but that this is a long-term goal and our current social context is not 
ideal. Sometimes using gender neutral pronouns implicitly denies trans men’s 
and women’s gender identity by “third-gendering” them, which is effectively a 
way to misgender them (387). Thus, the duty to not use gender-specific pronouns 
conflicts with the duty to not misgender trans people in a small range of cases.23 
That there are exceptions to this general rule does not completely defeat the duty 
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since part of the goal of gender-neutralizing English is to move away from our 
less than ideal social context to one that is less patriarchal and transphobic.  
 Dembroff and Wodak convincingly establish that the moral harms of 
misgendering are rooted in denying someone’s gender. In establishing the further 
point that, in general, we can use gender-neutral pronouns and gender-neutral 
language without misgendering anyone, they do us a great service. Their account 
brings to our attention the space between misgendering and gender affirmation 
that makes my arguments possible. Furthermore, their arguments for the link 
between gendered language, specifically pronouns, and gender essentialism is 
rigorously and convincingly stated. But I find myself skeptical that their 
arguments establish a duty not to use gender-specific pronouns for anyone. It 
seems to me that there is an important difference between their first claim, that 
we have a duty to not misgender genderqueer people and their second claim, 
that there is a duty to not use gender-specific pronouns for anyone. The former 
presents us with an act that is straightforwardly immoral, whereas the latter 
presents us with an act that we often have moral reason to engage in but it is not 
an act that is immoral to break.24 I am suggesting that Dembroff and Wodak have 
overstated the moral significance of this second point, and thus, mis-described 
the moral terrain by limiting themselves to discussion of duties. 
 Misgendering either a trans or genderqueer person seems clearly immoral 
for the reasons they state: (1) it is disrespectful of the person’s social or agential 
identity, (2) it denies them important resources, (3) it makes trans people 
unintelligible, and (4) it reinforces ideologies that reinforce transphobic and 
patriarchal oppression. These harms remain even when one unintentionally 
misgenders. There may be cases where one may be excused for misgendering, i.e., 
not blamed or held responsible for the act, but not cases where the act is morally 
permissible.25 The immoral status of misgendering here is important, because I 
believe it clues us into how Dembroff and Wodak are intending to use the 
concept duty.26 That is, it is drawing a connection between something being a 
moral duty and failing to do the relevant act being immoral, as opposed to say, 
an account of moral duties that amounts to us having good reason to do that 
thing.27   
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 None of the arguments Dembroff and Wodak give for the second thesis 
establish that using gendered language is immoral. Their first argument 
regarding the dilemma we are faced with proliferate pronouns is not a clearly 
moral argument. It seems to be an empirical matter about the number of 
pronouns one can cognitively handle. This is because, while they are correct that 
it would be inegaliatarian to use one pronoun set for all non-binary people, it is 
not immediately clear that a large number of pronouns actually would be too 
much for a linguistic community to handle. Furthermore, their point that using 
gender-neutral pronouns is not a case of misgendering still holds, so one would 
not necessarily need to carry all these pronouns, perhaps only committing to 
those “non-binary pronouns” that their friends, family, and other close relations 
use. Thus, this dilemma creates a prudential reason for one to use gender-neutral 
language (in most cases) but not a moral reason that establishes not using gender-
neutral pronouns is immoral.  
 Their second argument that pronouns can often out queer, trans, and non-
binary people also fails to establish that using gendered pronouns is immoral. It 
is true that the constant presence of pronouns does often force queer, trans, and 
non-binary people to out themselves, and that this is a moral risk. However, this 
supports a weaker claim than the one they make: that we should not use 
gendered pronouns for people we do not know. That gendered pronouns often 
force queer, trans, and non-binary people to out themselves has nothing to say 
about cases where one uses gendered pronouns for someone, they know 
personally and whose gender they are aware of. Gendered pronouns in these 
cases do not out anyone. Therefore, this argument supports a much narrower 
claim than the one Dembroff and Wodak want to establish.  
 Their third argument that gendered pronouns spread gender essentialist 
ideas is the closest to establishing that it is immoral to use gendered pronouns, 
but there are reasons to remain skeptical. Dembroff and Wodak are correct in 
drawing a connection between constant gendered-language, especially pronoun 
use, and gender essentialism. Using gender-neutral language, especially when 
one’s gender is not necessary information, will certainly fight gender 
essentialism. The question is, however, whether it is the only way to linguistically 
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fight gender essentialism. My arguments for gender affirmation suggest that it is 
not.  
Gender essentialism is the ideology that there are two, and only two, 
genders which are directly tied to one’s “biological sex” (i.e., one’s genital status) 
and that this difference is of utmost importance. Dembroff and Wodak’s proposal 
of using gender-neutral pronouns for everyone undermines gender essentialism 
by undercutting the importance of gendered categories. Via language, this 
approach essentially de-emphasizes gender distinctions, removing one of the 
ways gender essentialism reinforces the importance of the binary genders: by 
putting gendered information everywhere. But as I have argued, gender 
affirming trans people (including using gendered-pronouns) can often subvert 
the typical way gendered language functions to mark “biological sex,” and thus 
challenges gender essentialism’s connection between gender and genital status. 
This subversion could be even more effective if, instead of using gender-neutral 
pronouns for everyone, one only used gender pronouns for trans women and 
men (in addition to other gender marginalized people). This shift would center 
trans people (and other gender marginalized people) as paradigmatic cases of 
their gender instead of as marginalized cases. A corollary argument could be 
given for some non-binary people’s use of neo-pronouns (like the “ze” in 
Dembroff and Wodak’s paper title). As there are non-binary people who do not 
use the gender-neutral ‘they/them’ but instead opt for neo-pronouns to mark 
themselves as outside of the gender binary (e.g., Maia Kobabe who uses the 
Spivak pronoun set “e”/“em”/“eir”) (Kobabe 2019, 188-190). One can similarly 
argue that promulgation of such pronouns challenges gender essentialism’s 
focus on binary gender categories. That gendered pronouns, when used in 
particular cases, can also fight gender essentialism weakens the case that using 
gendered-pronouns is immoral because the same reasoning used to establish the 
immorality of gendered-pronouns can also be used to recognize the moral value 
of using gendered-pronouns when referring to trans people. Dembroff and 
Wodak are not wrong to recognize the link between gendered pronouns and 
gender essentialism, but they are mistaken in thinking that this link supports a 
moral duty to avoid using gendered pronouns.28  
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 One may push back here, stating that gender-neutralizing English should 
be a long term, political goal.29 Given our current non-ideal circumstances, it may 
be the case that using gendered pronouns is affirming to trans people, which is 
morally fine in the nonideal context, but that we should use gender-neutral 
pronouns as a default with the goal of eventually gender-neutralizing English.30 
It is important to point out that this position is not one where the concept of moral 
duty nicely fits, so we have already moved away from Dembroff and Wodak’s 
claim in “He/She/They/Ze.” Second, as I stated previously, we should use 
gender-neutral pronouns as a default. Such an approach avoids forceful outing 
of queer, trans, and non-binary people; it has a role in fighting gender 
essentialism; and it also avoids misgendering non-binary and genderqueer 
people, which I have agreed with Dembroff and Wodak is immoral. However, 
and perhaps this is where I most distinctly depart from Dembroff and Wodak, I 
am hesitant to share the goal of eventually gender-neutralizing English, 
especially if we construe pursuing this goal as a moral duty. That is not to say 
that I think it would be morally wrong to pursue this goal, or that a completely 
gender-neutralized English in the future would be harmful for trans people. My 
concern primarily stems from the assumption that we can know what an ideal 
moral world (and the attached linguistic practices) would be from our current 
position. There is no reason to think that a gender egalitarian society (that speaks 
English) necessarily requires gender neutralizing English. Construing the project 
of gender neutralizing English as a moral duty, one is engaging in a dangerous 
kind of moralism. 
 What I mean by ‘moralism’ here is perhaps slightly idiosyncratic. I am not 
claiming that Dembroff and Wodak are making a non-moral claim “moral”—that 
is taking some parochial value as being of moral value. However, I think they are 
overstating the moral status of the actions in question—taking something of 
moral value to have universal moral value. Construing gender neutralizing 
English as our end goal, and one which we have a moral duty to bring about, 
preemptively closes off other options to fight gender essentialism. Arguing that 
this project is a moral duty is monistic. It relies on a rule-based conception of 
ethics that lacks a sensitivity to the moral nuances of life under oppression, if not 
moral life more generally.31 
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I am proposing that we should have a pluralistic approach to fighting 
gender-essentialism, both in gender-neutralizing English in cases where it is 
irrelevant, and using gender-language in primarily, or only, subversive ways. 
Dembroff and Wodak’s argument for a moral duty closes off the possibility for 
this kind of pluralism. My concern is that they have mis-described the moral 
terrain by limiting themselves to discussion of duties. It is their focus on duties 
that leads them to ignoring the moral value of gender affirmation in the first-
place (2018, 382-384). Perhaps this is unfair as a criticism of Dembroff and Wodak, 
since their project is to determine what our duties are, but it is an important point 
all the same. As both Talia Mae Bettcher (2009; 2013; 2019) and María Lugones 
(2003) have discussed, marginalized people are navigating multiple contexts or 
“worlds” where interactions and meanings change. Duty seems too rigid a 
concept precisely because it is contextless. While duties can have exceptions, they 
are still meant (to some extent) to be universal—to mark out immoral actions that 
we ought to avoid. It is a blunt instrument in the moral philosopher’s toolkit. 
Thinking not about what we have duty to do, but about how we should perceive 
one another, and how our actions follow from such perceptions is much better 
suited for the problems facing queer, trans, and non-binary people. It allows for 
more negotiation between parties on how to be treated and allowance for not 
only removing oppressive language and practices but also subverting them.32  
My argument then is not that it is morally problematic for people to 
engage in the project of gender-neutralizing English, or wrong for someone to 
avoid using gender-specific pronouns, but that it is not a project we all must 
engage in on pains of immorality. Many of us, especially those of us in certain 
contexts of oppression, may want to engage in other, subversive ways of using 
language given our own contexts and dispositions. Focusing on duties often 
obscures that morality is in part a question of how we as individuals should live 
our lives. Our world offers so many ways for us to engage in moral behaviors 
and activities, which creates a certain amount of space for us to engage in 
different kinds of moral and political action as it resonates with our own 
character and dispositions.  
Iris Murdoch’s focus on the inner moral life of perception was largely due 
to their beliefs about how moral concepts shape our way of conceiving of moral 
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issues. They write that among the moral philosopher’s tasks is the attempt “to fill 
in a systematic explanatory background to our ordinary moral lives” in order to 
provide “rich and fertile conceptual schemes which help us to reflect upon and 
understand the nature of moral progress and moral failure” (Murdoch 1970, 43). 
Now, certainly, the concept of duty has some role in a rich and fertile conceptual 
scheme, but it is neither rich nor fertile all its own. My arguments establish that 
we also need concepts like moral perception and attention to understand how to 
make moral progress in our treatment of trans peoples. That it is not only in 
avoiding harm, but in uplifting trans people that we can fight marginalization. 
Moral perception and loving attention is particularly apt for understanding our 
moral lives in relation to trans people due to the concept’s evolution from Iris 
Murdoch’s own inspiration in Simone Weil, to Marilyn Frye’s discussion of the 
Loving Eye, which María Lugones developed in their plea for women to lovingly 
“world”-travel, which set the groundwork for Talia Mae Bettcher’s development 
of first-person authority. In thinking about not only what moral duties we have 
to follow, but the morality of our perception, we are able to attend to trans people 
on their own terms. The social reality of gender is much too rich and complex to 
make sense of with simplifying binary metaphysical concepts; the moral reality 
of what we owe to trans people is also rich and complex and requires moral 
concepts, like attention, subversion, and resistance, to match. 
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Notes 
1. There is a growing discussion in trans and queer spaces whether we should continue 
referring to one’s pronouns as “preferred” pronouns. Here I opt to use the “preferred” 
because I believe it is possible for someone to use pronouns other than one’s preferred 
while still not misgendering them. Robin Dembroff and Daniel Wodak (2018) defend 
this position and while much of my paper is critical of their arguments, I endorse this 
particular point. 
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2. Not all people who have genders outside of the binary self-identify as both 
‘genderqueer’ and “non-binary”, many will identify with just one of the two labels with 
further, more specific gender identities like agender, genderfluid, etc. However, 
throughout the paper I will be using ‘genderqueer’ and ‘non-binary’ interchangeably as 
the most general umbrella terms to capture all these various identities to make the prose 
less cumbersome.  
3. These are just some examples that have come up when talking with trans people in 
communities I frequent. Another, specifically for genderqueer people who present 
androgynously, is to feel gender affirmation when people get confused by their gender 
presentation. It is a regular point of discussion in genderqueer communities how people 
will sometimes go back and forth between ‘sir’ and ‘ma’am’ and how affirming it is. 
4. Outside of moral philosophy, the harms of misgendering have been explored by social 
psychologist Kevin A. McLemore (2015, 2018). 
5. Gender affirmation, as I’m discussing in this paper, involves the ways we affirm one 
another in social settings. There is a related concept of gender affirmative approaches to 
healthcare, which has been defended by Florence Ashley (2019).  
6. Dembroff and Wodak’s (2018) own position on gender affirmation is that there cannot 
be a moral duty to gender affirm someone, and thus the harm of misgendering cannot 
be found in violating this duty. However, as I will discuss extensively in this paper, there 
is more to morality than moral duties, and things can have moral value outside of what 
we have duties to do.  
7. Throughout the paper I will use gender-neutral pronouns for cisgender authors, and 
gender-specific pronouns for transgender authors as a demonstration of one potential 
way we can go about using gendered pronouns, contra Dembroff and Wodak (2018), 
which I will argue for in the final section of this paper. 
8. Murdoch referred to this as “moral vision”, I have decided to broaden the metaphor 
for the sake of skirting the issue of reinforcing ableism that metaphors of vision often 
promote. At times I will quote Murdoch’s own words where they use ‘vision’ language 
without alteration, but my own discussion will be in terms of perception. 
9. For other philosophers who have discussed the importance of moral perception for 
choice making, see John McDowell (1979), Martha Nussbaum (1992) and T.M. Scanlon 
(1998, 157). 
10. This way of conceiving of loving attention to people, by analogy to loving attention 
to movies, fleshes out a suggestion made by Susan Wolf (2014). 
11. That said, it is possible for a film to try and do something and fail. There are many 
Sci-Fi movies that aim to be deep and philosophical but end up being shallow and naïve. 
In seeing such a movie this way though, you are still evaluating it on its own terms. The 
film has just failed to live up to its own ideals. 
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12. There is of course more going on here than just one’s agential identity changing, but 
also practical matters of respecting one’s wishes regarding who they’re out to, but one’s 
wishes, in such cases, often track their agential identity. 
13. This is consistent with much of Murdoch wrote about the relationship between the 
inner and outer moral realms, as they state that some “overt action[s] can release psychic 
energies which can be released no other way” (1970, 42).  
14. One of the ways in which trans people, specifically trans women, are erased and 
marginalized is explored by Kapusta (2016). 
15. www.reddit.com/r/transpositive 
16. Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing this question to my attention. 
17. A similar point has been made by Robin Dembroff (2019) that, metaphysically 
speaking, trans people are a “critical gender kind.” My concern here is less about trans 
people’s metaphysical status, but more so the moral implications of being in this social 
position. 
18. Thanks to attendees at the Trans Philosophy Project at SPEP for this insight.  
19. See Venetia Patton (2000) for the way Black women under U.S. slavery were 
degendered. This process is still felt and experienced now. 
20. It is noteworthy that charges of being transgender/transsexual are used to 
masculinize the Williams’ sisters, which has implications for transphobia and the 
particularly precarious place that Black trans women find themselves in. Further 
development of these implications is beyond the scope of this paper, since all I mean to 
do at this point is recognize that it is not only trans people who often suffer from 
cisnormativity. For a fuller discussion of the relationship between transness and 
Blackness, see, C. Riley Snorton (2017).  
21. This point can perhaps be strengthened when considering that some trans and non-
binary people’s preference is for multiple differently gendered pronouns to be used in a 
single sentence for them, e.g., “Elle’s paper was quite good. She articulated his position 
clearly and gave good arguments for their thesis.” Misgendering via pronoun usage is 
not possible with someone who has these preferences because their preference is for all 
pronouns. However, if this person were non-binary and was referred to as a ‘woman’ or 
a ‘man’,  or perhaps called ‘sir’ this may count as misgendering and it would be for the 
reasons the Dembroff and Wodak articulate and not due to the person’s pronoun 
preference. 
22. I am altering the language slightly by talking about the reinforcement of gender 
oppression, but ultimately, I believe I’m picking out the same problem that Dembroff 
and Wodak are with their language.  
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23. It is worth noting here that there are more exceptions to the general duty than they 
recognize here since some cis people, like Black women and disabled people, also 
experience a form of misgendering via degendering (as I discussed in the previous 
section). 
24. It is worth noting here that Dembroff and Wodak (2018) make a significantly weaker 
claim regarding gender-neutral language in general, stating that “we take our 
arguments to suggest that we should be cautious with gender-related language, avoiding 
such language where it is irrelevant; that is a departure from the status quo, wherein we 
label gender ‘even when we don’t have to’” (399, authors’ emphasis). It is only using 
gendered-pronouns that they believe is immoral. This is worth noting because their view 
with regards to gender-related language is my view with regards to gendered pronouns.  
25. Such cases would include those of non-culpable ignorance, or even (potentially) 
casual slip-ups that are quickly corrected. 
26. It may be the case that Dembroff and Wodak are intending a different conception of 
duty in the second claim than in the first claim, but they do not specify this in the paper. 
What appears to be a subtle difference in understanding what a ‘duty’ is nevertheless 
significant when considering how one ought to act toward trans people. If Dembroff and 
Wodak do intend this difference, then they may agree with much of what I have to argue, 
but there is still value drawing out the points I make in their ambiguity.  
27. For example, consider how W.D. Ross (1930) argues that there are different kinds of 
moral duties: those duties that follow from general principles are prima facie duties (that 
which we have good reason to do) and final (all things considered) duties, which only 
apply in particular cases (16-47). The general principles Dembroff and Wodak are 
attempting to establish do not seem to be like Ross’ prima facie duties, but duties that are 
tracking the immoral—even if there may be exceptions. Thank you to Karl Martin Adam 
for bringing this point to my attention. 
28. Dembroff and Wodak (forthcoming) recognize this point in a later paper, “How 
Much Gender is Too Much Gender?”, arguing that while this position seems plausible, 
subversion could occur using different gendered language “woman/man” without using 
gendered pronouns. Thus, it is not necessary to use gendered pronouns. But the concern 
here, at least for me, is not whether it is necessary for subversion to use gendered 
pronouns, but whether it is immoral to use gendered pronouns. The ability to subvert 
gender essentialism without gendered pronouns should show that it is not.  
29. This is the focus of a different paper by Dembroff and Wodak (forthcoming), “How 
Much Gender is Too Much Gender?” While many of their arguments in this paper are 
similar to the ones in “He/She/They/Ze,” they make their case without using the concept 
of “moral duty” and the arguments are much more convincing because of it. My 
arguments here, then, may not apply to their arguments in that paper, but I still have 
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some reservations that will have to be saved for later, as they go beyond the scope of this 
current paper.   
30. In a Scientific American op-ed, Saguy, Williams, Dembroff, and Wodak (2019) state 
this as their goal explicitly: “Our proposed solution is to use gender-neutral pronouns 
as the default, with the long-term goal of using they/them pronouns for everyone.” Note 
that this position is different than it being a moral duty to not use gendered pronouns 
for anyone. Part of my point is that in using the moral concept ‘duty’ one is unable to 
state more subtle positions like the one they advocate for in their op-ed. Due to this op-
ed and Dembroff and Wodak (forthcoming) an ambiguity arises in their work about 
whether they believe using gender-neutral pronouns is a moral duty. My arguments 
here, then, can be taken to say we should side not take their arguments as ones for a 
moral duty and instead as a strategy to deal with our current world.  
31. My discussion of moralism is inspired by Serene Khader’s arguments in Decolonizing 
Universalism (2018, 30-34), however I am using it in a slightly different way here. 
Khader’s primary point is that western, missionary feminists often mistake political 
action as solely expressing moral judgments, instead of seeing how they are complicated, 
context dependent choices made by people situated under specific axes of oppression. 
My point here is that the Dembroff and Wodak (2018) are overstating the moral quality 
of a particular moral action, making it so that we understand morality as something less 
context dependent and more rule-based. In effect, a similar result occurs that Khader 
(2018) warns us of, that peoples’ “ways of seeing rule out questions about strategy choice 
and costs of intervention in advance” (34).  
32. This line of argument I take to be in the spirit of Annette Baier’s (1994) arguments in 
“What Do Women Want in Moral Theory?” There could plausibly be a similar question, 
what do queer or trans people want in moral theory?  
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